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TiE RESCUE DOCTRINE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACTIONS: SO MUCH FOR HEROES
David E. Seidelson*
Some things stick in your craw. You can't swallow them and you can't spit
them out. I'm going to try to get rid of a couple of fishbones that have been
choking me for a long time.
Remember Wagner v. International Railway. Co.?' Of course you do; everyone
does. Arthur Wagner, the plaintiff, and Herbert Wagner, his cousin, were passen-
gers on the defendant's electric railway? Because other passengers blocked the
aisle to the car, the two cousins stood among passengers on the car's platform.'
"The platform was provided with doors, but the conductor did not close them."4
As the car was passing from a trestle to a bridge, "[t]here was a violent lurch, and
Herbert Wagner was thrown out."5 The car crossed the bridge and stopped at the
bottom of the descending trestle.' "Night and darkness had come on."'7 "Another
car was due, and [the] body, if not removed, might be ground beneath the
wheels."8 To save his cousin, the plaintiff walked along the trestle some 445 feet
until he reached the bridge.' There the plaintiff found Herbert's hat, and then,
"miss[ing] his footing," the plaintiff fell to the ground below." Cousin Herbert
had already fallen to the ground. To recover for his injuries, Arthur sued the rail-
way company."
At trial, the plaintiff testified that he was asked to climb the trestle by the con-
ductor, who followed with a lantern. The conductor denied both prongs of the
plaintiff's assertion. 2 The trial judge, concluding that defendant's negligence
toward Herbert "would not charge the defendant with liability for injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff unless. .. the plaintiff had been invited by the conductor to
go upon the bridge ... and ... that the conductor had followed with a light,"13
instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover only if the jury found those two
facts. So instructed, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. 4 The
Appellate Division affirmed. 5 But the Court of Appeals of New York reversed. 6
Judge Cardozo, in what has probably become one of the most familiar, and
remains one of the most lucid, paragraphs in judicial writing, concluded that
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[d]anger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law
does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its conse-
quences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range
of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the
imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an open-
ing in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to
the parent who plunges to its aid. The railroad company whose train approaches
without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails,
but a wrongdoer also to the bystander who drags him from the path. The risk of
rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets
the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen a deliverer. He is accountable
as if he had.17
The first three words of that paragraph are potent in a number of different
ways, each elaborated on in the paragraph. Because danger invites rescue, a rea-
sonable jury could find that the rescuer was within the orbit of risk created by the
defendant's negligence, that is, that the rescuer was a reasonably foreseeable vic-
tim of that negligence. And because danger invites rescue, a reasonable jury
could find that the rescuer had not been contributorily negligent, even if the res-
cue attempt exposed him to peril. After all, a reasonable person in the rescuer's
circumstances might have acted in the same manner responding to the same invi-
tation. Finally, because danger invites rescue, a reasonable jury could find that
the rescuer had not assumed the risk of the peril; rather, his conduct was
impelled by the danger to the imperiled victim, consequently, not a wholly volun-
tary acquiescence in a known danger.
The defendant argued that "rescue is at the peril of the rescuer, unless sponta-
neous and immediate. If there has been time to deliberate, if impulse has given
way to judgment, one cause, it is said, has spent its force, and another has inter-
vened."' 8 Because the plaintiff had traversed 445 feet up the trestle to the bridge,
"[hle had time to reflect and weigh; impulse had been followed by choice; and
choice, in the defendant's view, intercepts and breaks the sequence."'19
Judge Cardozo wasn't having any. "Continuity in such circumstances is not
broken by the exercise of volition .... The law does not discriminate between
the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that
the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion."2
The defendant also argued that the plaintiff's rescue attempt had been
"futil[e]." 21 Had he gone with the others below the trestle, he would have found
his cousin's body. Consequently, the defendant argued, the plaintiff's "conduct
was not responsive to the call of the emergency; it was a wanton exposure to a
danger that was useless."22 Judge Cardozo saw the situation differently. He
17. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).







determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff's conduct was
reasonable in the circumstances:
There was little time for delay .... Another car was due, and the body, if not
removed, might be ground beneath the wheels. The plaintiff had to choose at
once, in agitation and with imperfect knowledge. He had seen his kinsman and
companion thrown out into the darkness. Rescue could not charge the company
with liability if rescue was condemned by reason. "Errors ofjudgment," howev-
er, would not count against him if they resulted "from the excitement and confu-
sion of the moment ... ." The reason that was exacted of him was not the rea-
son of the morrow. It was reason fitted and proportioned to the time and the
event.23
Thus did Judge Cardozo conclude that the plaintiff's case was legally sufficient,
even absent any invitation from the conductor to ascend the trestle and without
the conductor's following with a light.24 The opinion considered negligence,
proximate cause, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk and
described each element with a lucidity and persuasiveness common to Cardozo.
But forty-six years later, along came Sirianni v. Anna.2' The plaintiff,
Katherine Sirianni, alleged that the defendants, physicians and surgeons,
negligently removed all of the kidney tissue of ... Carl Sirianni [the plaintiff's
adult son] during the course of a surgical procedure .... It [was] medically cer-
tain that Carl Sirianni could not long live without human kidney tissue. For sev-
eral weeks his life was preserved by the use of a mechanical device designed as
a substitute for natural kidneys. This was a temporary measure. He began to
fail and death seemed certain. A human kidney transplant was needed if Carl
Sirianni was to live. After tests and examinations of several persons, it was
medically determined that the plaintiff possessed healthy, compatible kidneys,
and that with reasonable medical certainty, if a transplant succeeded, Carl
Sirianni would live. The plaintiff volunteered to surrender one of her kidneys.
The surgical procedure performed by other doctors was successful. Carl
23. Id. (quoting Corbin v. Philadelphia, 45 A. 1070, 1074 (Pa. 1900) (citations omitted)).
24. Id. at 438.
25. 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). Sirianni received very little contemporaneous scholarly atten-
tion. There is a critical case note, and a one-paragraph reference in the Torts section of Developments in New
York Law. Note, Torts-Rescue Doctrine- Vital Organ Donee Has [sic] No Cause of Action Against Doctors
Whose Negligence Caused Need for Transplant, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 133 (1968); George J. Alexander, Torts,
20 SvRACUSE L. REv. 434 (1968). In addition, the following appears in the Medical Liability Reporter: "Courts
have .. .been unreceptive to claims brought by organ donors against physicians whose negligence made a
transplant necessary. Citing Peterson [sic] v. Farberman, 736 S.W2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Moore v. Shah,
458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1982); Sirianni v. Anna 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). 10 MED. LLa.
REP. 228 (1988). There is a footnote reference to Sirianni in American Law Reporter at 76 A.L.R.3D 895 n.20
(1977).
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Sirianni lives, now nearly four years since the implantation of the kidney of the
plaintiff.26
Plaintiff claimed that "her health ha[d] been impaired by the loss of one of her
kidneys"27 and sued the defendants "on the theory that their negligent conduct in
removing the kidneys of her son ... [was] now available to her in order to main-
tain this action and constitute[d] a cause of action on her behalf"28 The defen-
dants filed motions to dismiss, and the motions were granted, the court believing
that "it [was] called upon ... to invent a 'brand new cause of action' presently
outside our legal concepts of suable tortious conduct."29
But what of the rescue doctrine so clearly and persuasively delineated and
applied in Wagner? To the Sirianni court, Wagner was inapposite. In Wagner,
the rescuer acted without knowing his fate. Here, with full knowledge of the
consequences of her voluntary action, this plaintiff mercifully surrendered up
one of her kidneys and preserved the life of her son. Judge Cardozo, as part of
the magnificent language, a trademark of his writings, wrote . . . "[t]he risk of
rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion." It seems to this Court
that Judge Cardozo used the word "wanton" synonymously with the word "wil-
ful," and not in the oft-used sense of reckless disregard. [See Ballentine Law
Dictionary with pronunciation, Second Edition.] "The word ordinarily means
intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary . . . ." Thus, it
appears that Judge Cardozo excluded from the rescue doctrine a "wanton" (wil-
ful) act on the part of the rescuer. The act of the plaintiff here is wilful, inten-
tional, voluntary, free from accident and with full knowledge of its
consequence.
3 0
Is that what Cardozo meant by "wanton?" I think not. He insisted that "[t]he
law does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who
counts the cost. It is enough that the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the
child of the occasion."3 1 Thus, even if Arthur Wagner, like Mrs. Sirianni, had
acted intentionally, voluntarily, free from accident and with full knowledge of the
26. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 710. Carl Sirianni sued the doctors whose conduct had cost him his kidneys.
That action was settled out of court for $280,000. Kidney Donor Sues MD s For the Loss, MED. WORLD NEWS,
Mar. 8, 1968, at 58.
"[Thirty-three]-year-old Carl Sirianni underwent surgery at Lockport Memorial Hospital. Doctors there
removed a kidney and what they thought was a tumor attached to it. Too late, they discovered that the 'tumor'
was really Sirianni's other kidney, fused to its mate." Id. The Court's description of the transplant may have
been too optimistic.
When the dialysis became ineffective, [Carl's] mother.., donated one of her kidneys to save her son's
life. The new kidney functioned well for nearly three years, then began to fail .... [A] cadaver kidney
was substituted. But the second graft also had to be removed because of bleeding and infection in the
area. Sirianni is currently being maintained on dialysis and is awaiting a third organ transplant. Id.
27. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
28. Id. at 711.
29. Id. at 712.
30. Id. (quoting from Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921)). The opinion in Sirianni
was written by Justice Hamilton Ward. 285 N.Y.S.2d at 710. In the course of the opinion the court refers to
"Hamilton Ward, the plaintiff Wagner's attorney." Id. at 712. The Hamilton Ward who represented Wagner was
the father of Justice Hamilton Ward, author of the opinion in Sirianni. Telephone interview with Hamilton
Ward, Jr., son of Justice Ward (Oct. 31, 1995). 1 wish to express my thanks to Attorney Ward for explaining the
familial relationship.
31. Wagner, 133 N.E. at438.
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consequences, he would have remained within the rescue doctrine spelled out by
Cardozo. Indeed, that seems to be precisely how Arthur did act. His effort to
reach the bridge by ascending the trestle was hardly accidental, and he certainly
must have recognized the consequences of falling to the ground. Yet, even if he
"counted the cost," as Mrs. Sirianni is said to have done, Arthur's case would
have been legally sufficient. Cardozo must have used the word wanton in the
sense of reckless disregard; the word as defined in Sirianni simply could not
coexist with the last quoted excerpt from Wagner. And one could hardly
describe Mrs. Sirianni's decision to donate a kidney to save her son's life as an
act of reckless disregard. Sirianni also attempted to distinguish Wagner on the
ground that the "negligence of [the] defendants [in Sirianni] came to rest on the
body of Carl Sirianni. The premeditated, knowledgeable and purposeful act of
this plaintiff in donating one of her kidneys to preserve the life of her son did not
extend or reactivate the consummated negligence of these defendants."32
To a large extent, that language seems to be hardly more than duplicative of the
court's not very persuasive effort to define wanton as intentional. To the extent
that it was intended to go further - to insist independently that the negligence of
the defendants came to rest on the body of the imperiled victim and did not
extend to the rescuer - the language flies in the face of the basic holding of
Wagner that "[t]he wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim"
and "also to his rescuer."3 It also belies one of the cases whose facts were recit-
ed by Cardozo: "The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child
that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid."34
In addition, Sirianni attempted to distinguish Wagner by asserting that in the latter,
[t]he rescuer may have considered the nature of his act without contemplating
its consequence. This is not the case here. However merciful and natural the act
of this mother in preserving the life of her son, [the court] holds that under the
circumstances of this case, "the rescue doctrine" has no application.35
But, as we have already noted, "[t]he law does not discriminate between the res-
cuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost."3 One can hardly count
the cost without contemplating the consequences.
Finally, Sirianni presented its ultimate "public policy ' 3' rationale:
The miracle of modem medicine seems now on the threshold of successfully
transferring many organs from one human body to another. The issue raised
here may in the future frequently find its way into the courts. This issue should
be settled. If public policy requires that a donor is permitted to maintain a cause
32. Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
33. Wagner, 133 N.E. at437.
34. Id. at 437-38 (citing Gibney v. State, 33 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1893)).
35. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
36. Wagner, 133 N.E. at438.
37. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
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of action under the circumstances here, such cause of action must be created,
not by judicial fiat, but by legislation .... 38
The implication of that language, if read quickly and without reflection, seems to
be that recognizing the plaintiff's cause of action might deter future organ trans-
plants "from one human body to another.' 39 But the defendants in Sirianni were
not the surgeons who performed the kidney transplantation; they were the sur-
geons whose alleged negligence necessitated the transplant." To extend cog-
nizance to the action asserted in those circumstances would hardly dissuade sur-
geons from performing such transplantation procedures.
Suppose a negligent motorist had struck Carl Sirianni and so severely and
irreparably injured his kidneys that, to save his life, Mrs. Sirianni donated one of
her kidneys. Suppose, too, that Mrs. Sirianni then sued the negligent motorist to
recover damages for the impairment to her health occasioned by the loss of one
of her kidneys. Would that generate a novel issue of public policy to be resolved
by the legislature or simply another appropriate instance for judicial application
of the rescue doctrine? I believe it would be the latter and I sense that the
Sirianni court itself might concur. I think the real sticking point for the court
was the application of the rescue doctrine in a medical malpractice action. Was
that a legitimate concern?
I suppose that a court could assert that a physician owes a legal duty only to his
patient and not to any third party, whatever the relationship between patient and
third party. But surely the time for that kind of narrow judicial assertion has
passed. Medical care providers have been found to owe a legal duty to reason-
ably foreseeable victims beyond the immediate patient. 1 And at the heart of the
rescue doctrine is the legal fact that while "[t]he wrongdoer may not have fore-
seen the coming of a deliverer[,] [h]e is accountable as if he had."'2 Because
danger invites rescue, the rescuer is within the orbit of risk created by the defen-
dant's negligence, that is, the rescuer may be reasonably foreseeable from the
perspective of the negligent defendant whose conduct imperils the original vic-
tim. There is nothing in that conclusion likely to deter physicians from perform-
ing organ transplantations from one human being to another. There may be
something in that conclusion to deter negligent care of a patient, and that may
not be all for the worse.
Yet Sirianni, while not binding on an appellate court, was found persuasive in
Moore v. Shah. 3 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that, as a result of the defen-
38. Id. There has been no legislation aimed at the issue in Sirianni. There has, however, been legislation
dealing with organ transplants from cadavers. See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, adopted in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia albeit with some modifications. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8601-8608
(1975 and West Supp. 1994); N.Y. PUBLiC HEALTH LAW §§ 4300-4309 (McKinney 1995).
39. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
40. Id. at 710.
41. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Lynch Homes--Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990) (physician owes a
duty to patient's sexual partner to give patient information to protect partner); see cases on both sides collected
at 15 MED. LiAB. REP. 141 June, 1993.
42. Wagner v. International Ry Co., 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
43. 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1982).
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dant physician's negligent care of the plaintiff's father, father-patient suffered
kidney failure, necessitating the plaintiff-son's donation of one of his kidneys to
save his father's life."' The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was
granted,4 and the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Division.46 The court
drew an analogy between cases denying recovery for shock suffered as a result of
the defendant's negligent injury to another and the case before the court.47 Those
other cases led the court to conclude that "[t]here are serious policy considera-
tions which militate against the recovery sought here."48 What were those con-
siderations?
Our decision may best be summarized in the words of then Associate Judge
Breitel in Tobin v. Grossman... : "Every injury has ramifying consequences,
like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit
the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree...." We decline here
to extend the common law to create a remedy for [this plaintiff].49
But Tobin"° was distinguishable from Moore in two significant ways. First, the
plaintiff-mother in Tobin sought damages for emotional distress and consequent
physical harm resulting from seeing her two-year-old child shortly after the child
had been struck by the defendant's car. 1 Second, the plaintiff-mother had not
been a rescuer. 2 Obviously, the second distinction makes Wagner and the rescue
doctrine inapplicable. As to the first distinction, the Tobin court was primarily
concerned about the inability to limit the class of persons who might assert simi-
lar claims for emotional distress: "[r]elatives, other than the mother, such as
fathers or grandparents, or even other caretakers, equally sensitive and as easily
harmed, may be just as foreseeably affected."53 In circumstances such as those in
Moore, there is hardly likely to be a long line of successive organ donors. Thus,
Tobin seems less than persuasive in denying recovery in Moore. Yet the court in
Moore wrote, "[i]t is difficult to charge a physician with the responsibility to
foresee each and every person other than his patient who might conceivably be
affected by his negligence."5 4  Is it really so difficult to foresee that an immedi-
ate family member is a likely kidney donor when the defendant's negligence
requires such a donation to save the primary victim's life? If so, why does the
search for a living donor invariably begin (and usually end) with the immediate
family of the primary victim?
44. Id.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id.
50. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
51. Id. at 420.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 422. The concern expressed in Tobin was abated somewhat in Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843
(N.Y. 1984), where the court, adopting the zone of danger rule, permitted a cause of action for emotional dis-
tress on behalf of immediate family member who witnessed injury to victim occasioned by defendant's negli-
gence. In Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993), the court construed the phrase "immediate fami-
ly member" so as to exclude niece of primary victim.
54. Moore v. Shah, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1982).
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Suppose a negligent motorist had struck the father and so severely and
irreparably injured his kidneys that, to save his life, his son donated one of his
kidneys. Suppose, too, that the negligent motorist had been a physician. If the
donor-son then sued the negligent motorist-physician to recover damages for the
impairment to the son's health occasioned by the loss of one of his kidneys,
would that action have generated "serious policy considerations which militate
against the recovery?""5 I suspect that the court would have treated the action as
simply another appropriate instance for judicial application of the rescue doc-
trine. The real sticking point, I think, remains the application of the rescue doc-
trine in a medical malpractice action. And I don't understand why. It is the res-
cuer who has long been considered a member of a favored class in the law's
view," not medical care providers, noble and necessary as their vocation is. It is
the rescuer who may put his own life or well-being in jeopardy to save a fellow
human. And it is the rescuer who, if successful, may mitigate the damages of the
primary victim to the economic advantage of the negligent actor. Consequently,
I believe that Sirianni and Moore improperly excluded the rescue doctrine in the
context of a medical malpractice action.
In Petersen v. Farberman,"7 the plaintiff-mother alleged that negligence on the
part of the medical care provider-defendants resulted in the necessity on the part
of the mother to donate a kidney to save her son's life. 8 "Asserting she acted to
rescue son, mother sought relief under the rescue doctrine for her pain, shortened
life expectancy, expenses resulting from the transplant procedure as well as the
loss of a kidney."59 As in New York, the rescue doctrine was no stranger to
Missouri jurisprudence. "The rescue doctrine has been accepted in Missouri for
a long time, and was recently expanded to include the situation where the object
of the rescue was responsible for putting himself in the situation necessitating his
rescue."6  But, apparently, this was the first time a plaintiff had sought to have
the doctrine applied in the context of a medical malpractice action. "This ... is
the first time a Missouri court has been faced with an organ transplant as a res-
cue. In fact it appears only the New York State Courts have been confronted with
this issue, and in both cases the courts denied relief"61
Perhaps not surprisingly, the only two judicial opinions available proved dis-
positive. "The Sirianni court reasoned the mother's donation of her kidney was
'wilful, intentional, voluntary, free from accident and with full knowledge of its
consequences,' and the rescue doctrine excludes recovery for a wilful act."62 As
to Moore,
55. Id. at 35.
56. "[Tlhe rescue doctrine ... holds the rescuer in a favored position in the eyes of the law." Note, Torts:
Proximate Cause: Rescue Doctrine 3 OKLA. L. REv. 476 (1950).
57. 736 S.W2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).




62. Id. at 442-43 (quoting Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921)).
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[t]he court reasoned a physician does not have "the responsibility to foresee
each and every person other than his patient who might conceivably be affected
by his negligence." The Sirianni and Moore courts gave public policy rationales
for their holdings. We agree with the reasoning in the New York cases .... The
rescue doctrine protects a plaintiff, who sees an emergency situation and, out of
humanitarian motives, acts to rescue the person who is in danger. 3
Thus saying, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plain-
tiff-mother's complaint, without for a moment reconsidering Sirianni ' conclusion
that Judge Cardozo had used "wanton" as a synonym for "intentional" - thus,
presumably leaving the rescue doctrine available only to the accidental rescuer -
and without examining the relative ease of foreseeing an immediate family mem-
ber as the donor of a kidney necessary to save the primary victim's life.64 The
court further failed to recognize that the plaintiff-mother fell precisely within the
court's own definition of the class of plaintiffs who may invoke the rescue doc-
trine: "The rescue doctrine protects a plaintiff, who sees an emergency situation
and, out of humanitarian motives, acts to rescue the person who is in danger."6 "
The second area in which the treatment or non-treatment of the rescue doctrine
disturbs me is that of product liability actions or, more precisely, one particular
product liability action. In Bobka v. Cook County Hospital,"6 Robert Bobka, a
fireman, participated in a drill instruction. "During the course of this instruc-
tion, an oil storage tank exploded, inflicting injuries to Robert. Robert was wear-
ing 'protective fire clothing' manufactured by defendant Morning Pride
[Manufacturing Co.]. Robert suffered severe bums allegedly due to the defective
condition of the protective fire clothing."6 6 Suzanne Bobka, the plaintiff and
Robert's only sibling, "was requested by the doctors to donate large segments of
her skin for Robert's grafts. She consented. Skin grafts, of the type accom-
plished here, usually result in permanent discoloration and scarring of the donor
site."69 To recover for her injuries, Suzanne brought a product liability action
against Morning Pride, alleging that its protective fire clothing was defective and
unreasonably dangerous and was the cause of her injuries. Morning Pride's
motion to dismiss the complaint against it was granted,7" and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed.7 1
The court recognized that the highest appellate court of the state had not limit-
ed product liability actions to users and consumers of the product; rather, it per-
mitted such actions to reasonably foreseeable victims.72 Such victims included
occupants of other vehicles and pedestrians injured by a defective motor vehi-
63. Id. at 443 (quoting from Moore v. Shah, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34-35 (App. Div. 1982)).
64. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
65. Peterson v. Farberman, 736 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
66. 422 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. App. 1981).




71. Id. at 1002.
72. Id. at 1001 (citing Winnett v. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Wl. 1974)).
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cle73 and bystanders injured by a shotgun barrel explosion occasioned by a defec-
tive shell.74 Nonetheless, the court concluded, as a matter of law, that the plain-
tiff in Bobka was not a reasonably foreseeable victim:
It cannot, in our judgment, fairly be said that a manufacturer should reasonably
foresee that he would be liable to a third party who voluntarily submitted to skin
graft surgery to aid the person injured by his product. It is not objectively rea-
sonable to expect such an event to occur and, importantly, there was no injury to
plaintiff caused by the defective product itself.
7 5
The court's opinion made no mention of the rescue doctrine. But wasn't the
plaintiff a rescuer of the primary victim of the allegedly defective product manu-
factured by the defendant? And isn't the rescue doctrine generally recognized in
product liability actions?
In Buehler v. Whalen,76 the court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs who
were injured as a result of a design defect which caused the quick spread of fire
when the car in which all but one of the plaintiffs had been riding was rear-ended
by another vehicle.77 "The other plaintiff [for whom judgment was affirmed],
Gerrell Forth, was burned while helping the occupants leave the car."7" Forth had
been the occupant of another vehicle.79
In Hood v. Roadtec, Inc.," the supervisor of a paving crew, seeing a road
paving machine, manufactured by defendant, rolling toward two members of the
crew, mounted the moving machine and attempted to engage the emergency
brakes, without success.8 The supervisor jumped from the machine as it rolled
off an embankment.82 "However, the machine landed on top of him, severely
injuring his legs."' The case was submitted to the jury on the theory of strict lia-
bility.84 Judgment was entered for the plaintiff.85 Because of an erroneous ruling
on the admissibility of the testimony of a witness whose identity had not been
revealed to the defendant in a timely manner, the appellate court vacated and
remanded.88 The appellate court, however, ruled specifically on the applicability
of the rescue doctrine in product liability actions.8
We reject outright the Defendants' assertion that the rescue doctrine is limited to
negligence actions. In Caldwell v. Ford Motor Co, . .. this Court specifically
applied the rescue doctrine to a case in which liability was predicated upon strict
73. Id. (citing Winnett, 310 N.E.2d at 1).
74. Id. at 1001, (citing Winnett, 310 N.E.2d at 1).
75. Id. at 1002.
76. 374 N.E.2d 460 (11. 1978).
77. Id. at 462.
78. Id. at461.
79. Id. at 462.
80. 785 S.W2d 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).





86. Id. at 363, 364.
87. Id. at 364.
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products liability .... We hold that the Trial Court correctly charged the jury
with respect to the rescue doctrine.88
In Barger v. Charles Machine Works, Inc.,89 plaintiff, a construction foreman
for a telephone company, was injured in attempting to rescue a crew member
imperiled by "a combination trenching, backhoe, and cable plow machine," man-
ufactured by the defendant." The case was a products liability action.91 The
appellate court reversed a judgment for defendant and remanded for a new trial
because the trial court's instructions erroneously permitted the jury to consider
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
9 2
We are not required to decide broadly the questions whether and in what cir-
cumstances an assumption of risk instruction may be given in a rescue situation
because we find that the assumption of risk instruction in this case, coupled
with the rescue instruction, presented a substantial risk that in reaching its ver-
dict the jury was permitted to consider and did consider evidence of [plaintiff's]
prior contributory negligence.93
In Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co.,9" the plaintiff's son, Trey, was using a mobile
acetylene unit while working at the family business.9 Seeing the acetylene unit
was on fire,
Trey... ran inside to get a fire extinguisher and returned with another employ-
ee but failed to put out the fire. They then ran back inside to get more extin-
guishers. Meanwhile, [the plaintiff, Trey's father, David] Hurt, seeing flames
shooting from the back of the truck [holding the acetylene unit], came running
out of his office with another fire extinguisher, thinking that his son might be on
fire. When he realized that Trey was not in danger, Hurt nonetheless still tried
to put out the fire. He quickly realized that the fire was inside the acetylene
cylinder and started to run away. However, it was then too late and he was
engulfed in flame as the acetylene cylinder exploded.9"
To recover for his injuries, Hurt sued the defendant, which had "designed, manu-
factured, tested, and sold"97 the acetylene cylinder; plaintiff alleged that "the fire
was caused by design defects in the ... cylinder."98
The acetylene cylinder, which had been transported in commerce, complied
with Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulations on Hazardous Materials.99
The trial court instructed the jury that such compliance created "a rebuttable pre-
88. Id.
89. 658 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 583.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 587.
93. Id.
94. 956 F.2d 1319 (6th Cir. 1992).




99. Id. at 1323.
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sumption" that the cylinder was not unreasonably unsafe for consumer use.1"' So
instructed, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. 1 ' The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 10 2 It concluded that the DOT
Regulations were applicable "to matters of transport and not consumer use."'0 3
As to the rescue doctrine, the Sixth Circuit wrote:
[W]hile ordinary negligence is not a defense in strict liability, assumption of
risk, or "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,"
is a defense. The specific elements that must exist for there to be assumption of
risk are 1) knowledge of the danger; 2) appreciation of the danger; and 3) volun-
tary exposure to that danger. Assumption of risk also requires the element of
nonforeseeability .. .[for] if an action is a foreseeable, normal, intervening
cause, it does not relieve a defendant of its responsibility .... In holding that it
is foreseeable that one will make a rational attempt to rescue personal property
in peril, [the precedent] establishes that foreseeability is an element of the res-
cue doctrine. "If the attempt to rescue is rational in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the time, it is a foreseeable risk .... ." Certainly, if it is
deemed foreseeable and rational for one to try to rescue one 's own personal
property, it is even more foreseeable that a man will try to rescue his son, initial-
ly placing him in the zone of danger, and thereafter stay to save his property.'"
If the rescue doctrine is recognized in product liability actions, why was it
ignored in Bobka? Was Bobka correct in holding that, as a matter of law, it was
not reasonably foreseeable that the original victim of the defendant's allegedly
defective protective fire clothing would be aided by a rescuer who "voluntarily
submitted to skin graft surgery?""1 5 Certainly severe burning is a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of protective fire clothing that is defective. And severe
burn victims frequently require major skin grafts. Surely a reasonable jury could
find it reasonably foreseeable that the original victim's only sibling would submit
to skin graft surgery to save her brother. The reasonable foreseeability obstacle
that Bobka found insurmountable would seem easily and naturally overcome by
the rescue doctrine.
But Bobka found another fatal flaw in the plaintiff's case: "[I]mportantly, there
was no injury to plaintiff caused by the defective product itself."'06 We know that
Robert Bobka, "a fireman, [was] participat[ing] in a drill instruction ... [when]
an oil storage tank exploded."'0 7 Because of the defendant's defective product,
Robert was set ablaze. 08 Let's assume that a third party passerby, seeing Robert
ablaze, dragged him from the fire. Let's assume, too, that the rescuer was burned
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1322.
102. Id. at 1329.
103. Id. at 1323.
104. Id. at 1325-26 (quoting Caldwell v. Ford Motor Co., 619 S.W2d 534, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981))
(emphasis added).
105. Bobka v. Cook County Hospital, 422 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Il. App. 1981).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1000.
108. Id. at 1001.
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by the fire. Would the rescuer's case against Morning Pride fail as a matter of
law because his injuries were inflicted by the fire rather than defendant's defec-
tive product? I think not. There would certainly be a cause and effect relation-
ship between the defective fire clothing and the rescuer's injuries. And the res-
cue doctrine would provide reasonable foreseeability. Aren't these two requisites
equally satisfied in Bobka? But for the defective fire clothing, it is alleged,
Robert would not have been seriously burned; because he was seriously burned,
his sister, the plaintiff, submitted to skin graft surgery to save her brother. It
seems clear that Suzanne Bobka's "attempt to rescue [was] rational in light of the
facts and circumstances existing at the time [and thus] a foreseeable risk.""1 9
Sirianni, Moore, and Petersen had the following element in common: the
plaintiffs sought to invoke the rescue doctrine in medical malpractice actions.
All three courts balked, Sirianni and Petersen because they defined "wanton" as
used by Judge Cardozo in Wagner to mean "intentional," a definition that hardly
can stand in light of Cardozo's language that "[t]he law does not discriminate
between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is
enough that the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the
occasion.""11 Sirianni and Moore threw in differing "public policy" ' considera-
tions. Sirianni's policy implies that recovery might thwart future organ dona-
tions by living donors and the novel issue should be left to the legislature. 12 But
surely it is Sirianni's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint that is more likely (if
anything) to dissuade a family member from donating an organ to save another
member of the family. Moore' policy concern, based on emotional distress
cases, was where to draw the line. In cases like Sirianni and Moore, a determina-
tion of those family members possessing "healthy, compatible kidneys"' 3 and
willing to donate one to save the original victim will pretty much draw the line
around a very limited group, and, of course, only an actual donor could sue as
rescuer. Petersen, in addition, acquiesced indiscriminately in the "public policy
rationales"' 4 of both Sirianni and Moore. Bobka simply ignored the rescue doc-
trine when that legal concept would have gone directly to the foreseeability issue
that the court found critical and ultimately fatal to the plaintiff's case. There
simply is no persuasive reason for excluding the rescue doctrine in medical mal-
practice cases or for ignoring its existence in a product liability action simply
because the defective product does not come in contact with the rescuer. It is in
those cases that the rescuer is most likely to recognize the consequences of his
decision to act. It is that rescuer who "counts the cost" who is the greater hero;
surely his heroism should not be the basis for precluding recovery. I think it's
time for courts to recognize that truism and eject the fishbones that are gagging
justice.
109. Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 E2d 1319, 1325-26 (6th Cir. 1992).
110. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
111. Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Moore v. Shah, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35
(App. Div. 1982).
112. Sirianni, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
113. Id. at 710.
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